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Sovereign wealth funds have an increasing presence in the global
financial ecosystem, principally through their investments in equi-
ties, which, in turn, may influence HRM. This study examines the
influence of the world's largest sovereign wealth fund, the Norwe-
gian Government Pension Fund‐Global (NGPF‐G), on employment
in its U.K. investee firms. We find that firms with NGPF‐G invest-
ment are significantly less likely to reduce their demand for labour,
more specifically in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial
crisis. When a drop in the demand for labour does occur, it is less
extreme when compared to similar organisations without a NGPF‐G
shareholding, and this is evident even in the case of relatively small
NGPF‐G investments. These findings are in line with the fund's objec-
tive of promoting corporate sustainability and Norwegian values.
We draw out the key implications of our findings for HR practice.
KEYWORDS
alternative investors, downsizing, Norway, Norwegian Government
Pension Fund‐Global (NGPF‐G), sovereign wealth fund (SWF),
sustainability1 | INTRODUCTION
There is a growing body of literature that explores the relationship between new or alternative categories of investor
and HR practices adopted by firms (Appelbaum, Batt, & Clark, 2013; Clark, 2007, 2013; Goergen, O'Sullivan, &Wood,
2014a; Gospel & Pendleton, 2014a). Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have become an important feature of the global
financial ecosystem. They are “state owned financial vehicles that administer public funds and invest them” (Bahgat,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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GOERGEN ET AL. 2892010: 163), potentially providing parent governments with future financial stability (Bahgat, 2010). Although some
have been the product of large nonmineral exports, most are founded on the export of primary commodities.
Due to their size, the activities of SWFs are expected to have far‐reaching consequences for the economies in which
they invest and for individual investee companies and their employees. Although emerging types of investor, of which
SWFs are one, may impact a range of HR practices, of particular concern has been their effect on jobs (Appelbaum &
Batt, 2014; Gospel & Pendleton, 2014a). This would reflect the extent to which changes in ownership may be asso-
ciated with the aggressive liquidation of physical assets and/or the adoption of strategies that treat labour as a readily
disposable or substitutable commodity. Not only may this lead to a loss of organisational specific human capital, which
raises issues around organisational sustainability, but also may cause the disruption of work teams, worsening inequal-
ity in the employment relationship and the spread of the survivor syndrome.
Even though there is quite extensive research on the effects of other categories of alternative investor (e.g., ven-
ture capital and private equity) on work and employment, little has been written on SWFs (for exceptions, see Gospel
& Pendleton, 2014a, 2014b), although they feature in wider scholarly debates on alternative investors (Appelbaum &
Batt, 2014). This study seeks to redress this gap in generating new quantitative evidence to supplement Gospel and
Pendleton's (2014a) earlier qualitative work. Specifically, we investigate the impact of equity ownership by the world's
largest SWF—the Norwegian Government Pension Fund‐Global (NGPF‐G)—on employees in U.K. listed firms.
Because no SWF is typical of the category and one cannot reach general conclusions on the likely impact of SWFs
on HRM based on the case of a single fund, one can provide evidence as to the level of shareholding at which influ-
ence may be secured, and the extent to which SWF investments may result in visible HR outcomes.
We focus on the NGPF‐G for several reasons. First, it is the largest SWF in the world in terms of equity invest-
ments (SWFI, 2014). Second, it expects investee firms to adhere to basic standards of social responsibility, including
towards employees (Dixon & Monk, 2012; Norges Bank, 2014). Although this may make it atypical, it does serve to
illustrate the diversity of the alternative investor financial ecosystem and the potential for even small investments to
have a substantial impact on firms and their people. Third, recent years have seen a significant increase in its acquisition
of U.K. listed equities, which facilitates a “before” and “after” investigation.We structure our research design so that we
are able to capture NGPF‐G's investments around the recent financial crisis so as to further enrich our findings in terms
of SWF impact in the context of a significant financial crisis. Fourth, the NGPF‐G is unique in publishing its ownership
stakes in all its investee companies. This is important as it allows us to accurately identify U.K. firms in which the
NGPF‐G hasmade an investment, andwhen this investment has occurred as well as ensuringwe identify a control sam-
ple of firms without NGPF‐G investment. Fifth, during the period of our study, the NGPF‐G did not invest in firms via
private equity, so we are therefore able to focus exclusively on direct investments.1 Finally, given the impact of country
of origin on SWF behaviour (Gospel & Pendleton, 2014a), the NGPF‐G represents a particularly interesting case given
that Norway is a social democracy, notable for progressive and employee‐friendly HR policies (Amable, 2003).
Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the relationship between investors and HRM
and how types of investor, including SWFs, are expected to influence corporate behaviour around employment. In
Section 3, we introduce the NGPF‐G. In Section 4, we present our sample and explain our research methodology.
In Section 5, we discuss our empirical findings, and in Section 6, we discuss the practical HR implications of our find-
ings, identify limitations, and suggest avenues for further research.2 | INVESTORS, HRM, AND SWFS
There is a growing body of work linking investor behaviour with work and employment issues. Lazonick and O'Sullivan
(2000) argue that in liberal market economies, legislative reforms in the 1980s and 1990s confirmed the primacy of
shareholder value and strengthened the rights of investors over those of managers and, indeed, workers. This has
been associated with the empowerment of financial intermediaries and alternative investors who are lightly commit-
ted to particular industries and locales, and the commensurate weakening of the position of workers (Appelbaum
290 GOERGEN ET AL.et al., 2013). Although investors may press their demands through either voice or exit, it is easier for mobile and
uncommitted investors to exercise the latter route. It can be argued that the influence of SWFs on HRM is likely to
be indirect and limited, as they are rarely sole owners (Gospel & Pendleton, 2014a), and because their investment
strategies are passive (Gospel, Haves, Pendleton, Vitols, & Wilke, 2010). However, in a climate of low investor com-
mitment, the threat by investors to sell even quite small shareholdings can have a significant effect on management,
incentivising, or discouraging specific managerial behaviour (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009; Jacoby, 2005).
A significant body of HR literature suggests that the strengthening of investor rights has translated into strong
pressure to disseminate more hard‐line approaches to HRM, characterised by arm's length contracting, reduced secu-
rity of tenure, more rigorous monitoring of performance, and the squeezing of wages and/or the use of variable pay
(Collings, 2014; Thompson, 2011). In particular, downsizing is often seen as a relatively simple mechanism for boosting
the market value of the firm (Nixon, Hitt, Lee, & Jeong, 2004), often due to an anticipated reduction in costs, even if its
real effect on financial performance is less obvious (Zyglidopoulos, 2005). Although it could be argued that alternative
investors have broadly similar agendas and are particularly keen to press for job cuts and generally more hard‐line HR
policies (Appelbaum & Batt, 2014), others have suggested that the alternative investor ecosystem is quite diverse, and
those with longer time horizons may favour human capital development over radical job cuts (Wood, 2015). Indeed,
the recent experience of Sports Direct would suggest that investor pressure can potentially have positive effects on
HRM. In this case, an adverse reaction by several institutional investors in 2016 following labour scandals has resulted
in promises of better practice. A year prior to the scandals, the NGPF‐G raised concerns as to poor labour practices
amongst Sports Direct's suppliers (Milne, 2015), and consequently asked Sports Direct to improve their reporting
on labour‐related issues. Moreover, given that the NGPF‐G's raison d'être is intergenerational savings of foreign
exchange windfalls from North Sea oil and gas (Bahgat, 2010), some SWFs may have more of an interest in long‐term
HR policies than, say, hedge funds, whose time horizons are often extremely short term.
Although SWFs may potentially impact on many HR policies and practices, their effect on the demand for labour
is arguably, along with reward systems, the most important, in that it impacts on the relative willingness of firms to
invest in people, on employee commitment to the firm, and the durability of collective identities and representation
(c.f. Goergen, Brewster, &Wood, 2009; Kelly, 1998). Although SWFs have traditionally focused on a longer‐term hori-
zon than hedge funds or private equity, Gospel and Pendleton (2014a) suggest this may be changing. Such a trend
towards greater short‐termism would leave workers worse off. Again, Appelbaum and Batt (2014) argue that SWFs
are often interpenetrated with other new categories of activist investor, notably private equity, with a focus on value
release rather than organisational sustainability; however, their study primarily focuses on private equity, and their
discussion on SWFs is at the conceptual level.
Theoretically, the potential impact of SWFs on employment is complex and depends largely on the specific SWF.
SWF investment may help the position of employees through the provision of much needed capital infusions to
struggling firms (Gospel, Pendleton, Vitols, & Wilke, 2011). However, SWF involvement may also lead to job cuts and
insecurity (Moeller, 2009). Gospel and Pendleton (2014a: 27) suggest that the strategies of SWFs and other
“new investment funds”will be moulded by country of domicile and, in liberal market economies such as the U.K., there
will be greater room to introducemore hard‐line HR policies. Of course, in the case of the NGPF‐G, country of domicile
influences would be expected to include a long‐term and sustainable perspective as well as an inclination to counte-
nance greater employee–employer interdependence through greater investment in people and lower staff turnover
rates than other types of investors and SWFs (Goergen, O'Sullivan, & Wood, 2014b; Gospel & Pendleton, 2014a). Of
course, it may be that SWF investment has no discernible impact. Indeed, prior case study evidence suggests minimal
influence by SWFs onwages, working conditions, and employee voice (Gospel et al., 2010;Wilke, Vitols, Haves, Gospel,
& Voss, 2009). In a case study of the effects of the Dubai SWF‐linked Dubai Ports World's acquisition of P&O, Gospel
et al. (2011) found few effects on employment but noted minor, albeit detrimental, changes in voice and pensions. The
objective of this study is to provide empirical insights where there currently are few, and in doing so to address many of
the points raised above by investigating the impact of equity ownership of one prominent SWF, the NGPF‐G, on
employment in U.K. listed firms. Specifically, our main research question is whether NGPF‐G investments in U.K. listed
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Kingdom to ensure our findings are not influenced by different employment‐related legislation in different countries.3 | THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND‐GLOBAL
The NGPF‐G is a SWFwhere the surplus wealth produced byNorwegian petroleum income is held. Despite its name, the
NGPF‐G is not a pension fund but could help fund state pensions. The NGPF‐G is the largest SWF in the world, owning
approximately 1.2% of all globally listed securities and approximately 2.5% of all European listed securities (Norges Bank
Investment Management, 2013). The Norwegian Ministry of Finance manages it, with operational management being
delegated toNorges Bank InvestmentManagement, a subsidiary of the Norwegian Central Bank (Ainina &Mohan, 2010).
The Norwegian Ministry of Finance regularly publicises its expectations and excludes firms from investment: this
includes all weapons manufacturers, those who transact with such manufacturers, firms whose activities negatively
impact on human rights, and those who engage in corruption and other violations of ethical norms or “severe environ-
mental degradation” (Reiche, 2010: 3572). In addition to arms manufacturers, tobacco manufacturers and palm oil
producers have been excluded, as well as Walmart for labour issues (Dixon & Monk, 2012; Pier, 2007) and Cairn
and Kosmos for ethical issues (Milne & Kiran, 2016). From 2012 to 2014, the NGPF‐G divested from 114 companies
(Milne, 2015). In addition to exiting, the Fund has voted against 15% of board recommendations at annual shareholder
meetings, including the re‐election of Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan, and Lloyd Blankfein, chairman of Goldman
Sachs, as well as the issue of new preference shares by BMW (Milne, 2015; see also Sandbu, 2016; Financial Times,
2016). This suggests that even with relatively small ownership stakes, the NGPF‐G is very willing to make its views
known and expects them to be listened to. The core focus of this research is on whether the NGPF‐G does affect
the demand for labour by its target firms and what this effect is.4 | SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY
4.1 | Sample selection
Because the objective of our study is to investigate the impact of ownership by the NGPF‐G on the demand for labour
by its target companies, we construct a panel of data, that is, a cross section repeated over a number of years, includ-
ing years preceding the NGPF‐G investment and years with NGPF‐G investment. We first identify which U.K. listed
companies had such investment. We obtain the list of U.K. firms with NGPF‐G investment from the NGPF‐G's
website. We then check whether these firms are incorporated in mainland United Kingdom, excluding firms from
the Channel Islands and U.K. overseas territories. We also exclude investment trusts. We arrive at 508 firms with
NGPF‐G ownership for at least 1 year over the period of 2006–2013.
The second task is to identify a suitable control group of non‐NGPF‐G targets to enable reliable comparisons to
be made. This is achieved as follows. First, we review existing studies that have investigated the likelihood of SWF
investment. Sojli and Tham (2011) and Kotter and Lel (2011) suggest that SWF investment is more likely in larger firms
(market capitalisation, turnover, and assets) and firms with higher sales growth (sales growth); higher growth oppor-
tunities (market‐to‐book ratio); greater accounting performance (return on assets); greater levels of cash (cash as a
proportion of total assets); lower levels of short‐term debt (short‐term debt as a proportion of total assets); and higher
dividend payments (dividend yield). Second, we collect data on each of these variables for all U.K. listed firms in the
year immediately preceding the NGPF‐G investment from Datastream. The definition of these variables and those
of the other variables used in this study can be found in Table A1. Third, we winsorise the variables at the 10% and
90% percentiles to reduce the impact of outliers. Fourth, we utilise propensity score matching (PSM) to match each
target firm with a nontarget firm (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). We run a logit regression based on the observations
from the year preceding the first year of NGPF‐G investment for the 508 firms that were targets of NGPF‐G
TABLE 1 Characteristics of target firms and control firms
Target firms Control firms
Mean Median Mean Median
t‐test for diff.
in means
z‐test for diff.
in medians
Ln (market capitalisation) 13.72 12.72 13.68 12.66 −0.102 0.064
Ln (sales) 11.62 11.82 11.56 11.59 −0.284 −0.655
Ln (total assets) 13.84 12.83 13.75 12.92 −0.238 −0.347
Ln (sales growth) 2.92 2.99 2.72 2.75 −1.431 −1.441
Ln (market‐to‐book ratio) −0.02 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.672 0.466
Ln (return on assets) 9.21 9.21 9.21 9.21 0.485 −0.301
Ln (cash over total assets) 2.23 2.39 2.13 2.37 −0.617 −0.503
Ln (ST debt over total assets) 1.14 0.98 1.01 0.74 −0.997 −1.144
Ln (dividend yield) 0.97 1.14 0.92 1.02 −0.477 −0.496
292 GOERGEN ET AL.investment during the period of our study and observations for all non‐NGPF‐G target firms. The dependent variable
is an indicator variable indicating the first year of NGPF‐G investment. All independent variables are measured in the
previous year, that is, with a lag of one. This logit provides us with a propensity score for all firms, and we use the
nearest neighbour approach to identify suitable matches. We specify a maximum caliper distance of 0.1 to reduce bias
by minimising systematic differences between the matches. Fifth, we only seek nearest neighbour scores for control
firms in the same industry (using the FTSE industrial classification) and year as the target.2 Thus, we match targets in
terms of propensity score and also preserve the industrial closeness of our targets to the nontarget matches. This pro-
cedure allows us to successfully match 111 of the 508 targets. The prematching logit is reported in column 1 of
Table A2. The logit has a high pseudo‐R2 with a value of 0.332, and most of the independent variables have statisti-
cally significant coefficients. Finally, to confirm the quality of our matching, we proceed as follows. First, we rerun the
logit underlying the PSM on the matched sample. As expected, the postmatching logit (see column 2 of Table A2) has
little explanatory power as its pseudo‐R2 is close to zero and the coefficients on the independent variables are insig-
nificant, except for one which is just about significant at the 10% level. Second, we use mean and median comparisons
to test for differences between the targets and matched nontargets for each of the explanatory variables included in
our propensity score logit regression. We fail to identify any statistically significant differences between the two
samples (see Table 1); hence, we are confident that our matching is of good quality.
4.2 | Method
Because our aim is to assess the effects on employment of NGPF‐G ownership in the target firms, including possible
workforce downsizing, we estimate a labour demand equation. Our equation is based on Nickell (1984; see also
Conyon, Girma, Thompson, &Wright, 2002; Goergen et al., 2014b). Subject to several assumptions (see, e.g., Goergen
et al., 2014b), the demand for labour for a given firm is a function of its expected output quantity and the ratio of the
expected wage rate to the firm's expected cost of capital. It can be expressed as follows:
Lit ¼ αLi;t−1 þ β1wi;t−1 þ δ1Qit þ δ2Qi;t−1 þ γi þ ηt þ εit: (1)
where Lit is the quantity of labour (the natural logarithm of the number of employees) for firm i in year t; wit is the real
wage rate relative to the firm's cost of capital (the natural logarithm of real wages); Qit is real output over value added
(proxied by real turnover as per Nickell, Wadhwani, & Wall, 1992); γi is unobservable (firm) fixed effects; ηt is a time
varying error term common to all firms; and εit is an error term that varies across time and firms. We estimate the
above equation adopting a difference‐in‐differences (DID) approach. The aim of the DID approach is to determine
what effect NGPF‐G investment has on the demand for labour while allowing for possible intrinsic differences in
labour demand between NGPF‐G target firms and non‐NGPF‐G target firms. Such intrinsic differences may arise if
GOERGEN ET AL. 293the matching process has omitted important variables. In other words, our DID approach adjusts for differences
between the NGPF‐G target firms and the nontarget firms that may remain after the PSM.
We add the following variables to Equation 1 in order to perform the above‐mentionedDID analysis.3 First, our key
variable is NGPF‐G Ownershipit, the percentage of ownership held by NGPF‐G in firm i in year t. This variable measures
the effect of NGPF‐G's investment on employment. Second, we add the following three indicator variables. Target Firmi
is set to one if firm i has NGPF‐G investment during at least 1 year of the period of study, and zero otherwise. This
indicator variable measures the employment effects affecting target firms independent of the NGPF‐G investment.
Control Firmi is the equivalent indicator variable for the nontarget firms. To avoid perfect colinearity, the constant is
omitted from the regressions. The third indicator variable, NGPF‐G Yearit, is set to one for firm‐year observations with
NGPF‐G investment. It is also set to one for the same years for the equivalent nontarget firm. It is set to zero otherwise.
This indicator variable accounts for possible employment effects affecting both target firms and control firms during
years with NGPF‐G investment. This variable would pick up industry‐wide employment effects (and/or any other
effects pertaining to other firm characteristics) that affect all firms in that industry (and/or with the same firm
characteristics) at a particular time (i.e., the yearswithNGPF‐G investment) and that are not due to NGPF‐G investment
itself. Finally, some regressions include NGPF‐G Ownership * Year 2009 (No NGPF‐G Ownership * Year 2009) instead of
NGPF‐G Ownership. This is the interaction between NGPF‐G Ownership (No NGPF‐G Ownership, that is, a dummy
variable set to one if there is no NGPF‐G ownership in year t, and set to zero otherwise) and the year 2009 dummy
variable.4 The two interaction termsmeasure the differential effect of NGPF‐Gownership and its absence, respectively,
on employment in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.5
The augmented Equation 1 is a dynamic equation as it includes the lagged dependent variable (i.e., Li,t‐1) on the
right‐hand side and is estimated for a panel of data, that is, a cross‐section repeated over the years 2006 to 2013.
Two econometric challenges arise (Abdallah, Goergen, & O'Sullivan, 2015). First, the presence of unobservable fixed
effects causes the error term in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to be correlated with the explanatory
variables. Hence, the OLS estimates of the coefficients on the explanatory variables will not be consistent, that is,
they will be biased, and the bias will not be reduced by increasing the sample size. Second, the coefficient on the
lagged dependent variable will be upward biased as the lagged dependent variable will be correlated with the
unobservable fixed effects. A way forward is to estimate the equation using a fixed‐effects or within groups (WG)
regression procedure. This procedure takes the time mean from each variable's observation, including the dependent
and independent variables, and then estimates the regression based on the demeaned variables. As they are assumed
to be time invariant, the WG procedure effectively eliminates the unobservable fixed effects. However, it also
generates a biased estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. In contrast to OLS, the estimated
coefficient is downward biased.
A way forward is to use a system generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator (Blundell & Bond, 1998). This
estimator is based on an instrumental variable approach using two types of equations and internal instruments: equa-
tions in levels using the lagged differences of the dependent and independent variables as instruments and equations
in first differences using the lagged levels of the dependent and independent variables as instruments. The estimated
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is likely somewhere between the upward biased OLS and the downward
biasedWG coefficient estimates. In what follows, we report the regression results from all three estimation techniques.5 | EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
5.1 | Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports the NGPF‐G investments across time (Panel A) and across industries (Panel B). The table is based on
the 111 target firms from the PSM. The average and median stake is around 2%, with the maximum just below 9%.
NGPF‐G's investments are most frequent in firms operating in the consumer services and industrial sectors.
TABLE 2 Norwegian Government Pension Fund‐Global ownership across time and across sectors
Panel A: Ownership distribution across time
Year N Mean Median Min Max
2006 2 1.08 1.08 0.58 1.58
2007 46 0.38 0.14 0.01 2.04
2008 39 1.00 0.96 0.06 2.88
2009 46 1.57 1.35 0.01 4.68
2010 52 2.03 1.49 0.01 5.81
2011 51 2.56 2.33 0.02 8.07
2012 49 2.40 2.29 0.02 7.54
2013 79 1.91 1.73 0.01 8.53
Panel B: Ownership distribution across industries
N % Cumulative %
Basic materials 7 6.31 6.31
Consumer goods 7 6.31 12.61
Consumer services 24 21.62 34.23
Financials 15 13.51 47.75
Health care 9 8.11 55.86
Industrials 27 24.32 80.18
Oil & gas 6 5.41 85.59
Technology 12 10.81 96.40
Telecommunications 3 2.70 99.10
Utilities 1 0.90 100.00
Total 111 100.00
294 GOERGEN ET AL.5.2 | Regression analysis
Table 3 reports the results for the OLS (columns 1 to 3), the WG (columns 4 to 6), and the system GMM (columns 7 to
9) regressions. Regressions 1, 4, and 7 include NGPF‐G Ownership, whereas the remaining regressions include the
interaction between NGPF‐G Ownership and Year 2009 as well as the interaction between No NGPF‐G Ownership
and Year 2009. Again, the two interaction terms measure the effect of NGPF‐G ownership and its absence, respec-
tively, on the demand for labour in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.
As expected, with one exception,6 the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is greatest for OLS and lowest
for WG and somewhere in between the two for system GMM. The coefficients on Target Firmi and Control Firmi are
significant (at the 5% level or better) in all the regressions and are of a similar size.7 This suggests that there are no
differences in the demand for labour between the target firms and the control firms, independent of NGPF‐G invest-
ment, alleviating concerns about possible selection issues.
Further, the coefficient on NGPF‐G Ownership is positive and significant (at the 10% level or better) in all three
regressions that include this variable. More importantly, NGPF‐G Ownership * Year 2009 is not significant, whereas
No NGPF‐G Ownership * Year 2009 is significant at the 1% level and negative. This suggests that firms with NGPF‐
G ownership do not reduce their demand for labour in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. In con-
trast, firms without NGPF‐G ownership in 2009 reduce their demand for labour during that same year, as a reaction
to the 2008 financial crisis. The significant and negative coefficient corresponds to a decline in employment of
between 33.0% (column 8) and 33.9% (column 2).
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GOERGEN ET AL. 297We also include variables measuring the ownership by various types of largest shareholder (with very few excep-
tions this is not the NGPF‐G), that is, the state, families, pension funds, venture capitalists/private equity houses,
industrial companies, or other types of shareholder, or own treasury shares.8 Generally, the ownership by the largest
shareholder does not influence the demand for labour as the coefficient on this variable is not significant in any of the
regressions. However, there is evidence that the type of largest shareholder matters: For the government and pension
funds, we observe a significant and negative effect in a number of regressions. Whereas the number of firm‐year
observations with pension funds as the largest shareholder is too small to draw any meaningful conclusions, the gov-
ernment only emerges as the largest shareholder in the financial institutions it rescued because of the 2008 financial
crisis. We also observe a significant and negative effect if the largest stake in the firm is held in the form of treasury
shares. Treasury shares are the result of share repurchases. One of the motivations for share repurchases is the
management's belief that the firm's shares are undervalued. Such undervaluation may be combined with downsizing
of the workforce. However, this would suggest mere correlation rather than causation.
To sum up, we find evidence that the NGPF‐G prevented a drop in the demand for labour in the aftermath of
the 2008 financial crisis. Importantly, there is no evidence that firms with NGPF‐G investment had excess demand
for labour during the period of study of 2006 to 2013. Does NGPF‐G ownership ultimately have a negative effect
on firm profitability given that it reduces potential workforce downsizing? To answer this question, we regress
(not tabulated) profit over turnover on the same variable measured in the previous year, NGPF‐G ownership, Target
Firmi, and NGPF‐G Yearit, and year and industry dummies. We find that NGPF‐G ownership has no effect on firm
performance.6 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our study confirms that alternative investors have far reaching consequences for HRM (Appelbaum & Batt, 2014;
Appelbaum et al., 2013). Our findings document that a reduced demand for labour does not necessarily lead to higher
returns, so activist investors who base their business models on such assumptions are likely to be disappointed. We
find that SWF investments, even when relatively small, can have a significant effect on the HR practices of investee
firms, specifically in relation to the demand for labour.
However, SWFs are diverse and the impact of other SWFs on employment may be quite different. For example,
prior work on Gulf SWFs in the United Kingdom has reported negligible or detrimental effects (Gospel & Pendleton,
2014a). Theoretically, our study highlights the need for viewing alternative investors within the context of the insti-
tutional domains in which they are nested (c.f. Jacoby, 2005). In other words, the policies alternative investors seek
to impose will reflect, at least in part, their country of origin's institutional environment. Although the literature on
comparative capitalism assumes that owner agendas will follow on contextual dynamics, it only accords limited atten-
tion to differences in investor categories, and the extent to which some are more likely to concur or actively seek to
reinforce a particular national model than others (c.f. Wood, Dibben, & Ogden, 2014). There is an extensive body of
HR literature that looks at country of origin and domicile effects on the firm itself, but not its owners (Brewster,
Wood, & Brookes, 2008; Ferner, Almond, Colling, & Edwards, 2005; Ferner et al., 2011). Our study reveals strong
country of origin pressures from owners that have the effect of supplementing national level regulation. An important
agenda for future research would be to provide a more integrated understanding of contextual effects on both owners
and firms.
Our findings suggest three key implications for the practice of HRM. First, there is not necessarily a relationship
between employment and job security and organisational performance/efficiency. In other words, employers—and HR
managers—that promote lean staffing (and, by implication, an associated atmosphere of insecurity) in pursuit of an
enhanced bottom line may be pursuing a fool's gold. Secure workforces are more likely to be committed to the firm
and hence have greater incentives to enhance their organisation‐specific (as opposed to immediately externally mar-
ketable) human capital. This would offset any benefits that might accrue from a reduced wage bill, the disciplinary
298 GOERGEN ET AL.power imparted by insecurity, and numerical flexibility. It is important for HR managers to recognise the constrictions
and opportunities flowing from different categories of owner (c.f. Bushee, 2004). Moreover, workers who are more
secure in their jobs are more likely to voice any concerns, rather than seek redress via the external labour market. This
may make for better communication and easier resolution of areas of dispute.
Second, if the optimal HR strategy varies according to locale and sector, then firms that wish to provide high
levels of security of tenure, in order to incrementally build and husband organisation‐specific knowledge and capabil-
ities, would do well to attract investments from the NGPF‐G. In turn, the NGPF‐G has shunned controversial indus-
tries and firms associated with low labour standards. There is evidence that a number of differing institutional
investors have begun to take employee well‐being more seriously and are translating this into investment choices
(CIPD, 2016).
Third, although it is often assumed that a relatively small stake by an alternative investor will have minimal effects
on HRM, our findings suggest otherwise. The NGPF‐G is generally more likely to sustain employment than many other
alternative investors (c.f. Appelbaum et al., 2013). This suggests that HR managers—and trade unionists—need to
deepen their understanding of the nature and behavioural patterns of new investor categories, keep abreast of
changes in their firm's shareholding, and develop policy options to respond to the latter. As Jacoby (2005) notes, in
contexts with highly mobile investors, HR managers need to be aware of the likely agendas imposed or encouraged
by specific investors and react accordingly. Although it is often held that greater owner activism may leave workers
worse off, it is evident that the converse can also be true. Although this study focuses on jobs, maintaining/reducing
the demand for labour is not the only behaviour that has an impact on HRM. SWF investment may, for example, also
impact on rewards and pensions (Gospel & Pendleton, 2014a, 2014b). Therefore, this constitutes a limitation of
our study.
Although NGPF‐G investment may not lead to higher levels of overall employment, our results suggest that it
reduces proclivity to engage in downsizing. However, it is less clear how this comes about. Further research should
investigate the methods through which an SWF, such as the NGPF‐G, actually seeks to influence corporate behaviour,
although implicit threats of exit are likely to exert a strong influence. For example, in the case of the NGPF‐G, it may
be due to managers being aware of the NGPF‐G's reputation for promoting Norwegian values and aligning their firm's
actions accordingly. The NGPF‐G is an explicitly ethical SWF. However, there is no evidence that SWFs from
dictatorships with poor human rights track records would have any interest in labour standards. This study could
be extended to include other SWFs and provide a broader picture of this expected diversity of the impact on HR prac-
tice of other SWFs.
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ENDNOTES
1 However, the NGPF‐G is open to invest in private equity in the future (Holter & Mohsin, 2016).
2 We transform the propensity scores obtained from the previous step via the following formula: Amended Propensity
Score = Year * 100 + Industry Code * 10 + Propensity Score.
3 This is effectively a double DID, combining both a cross‐sectional and a time‐series DID (see Roberts & Whited, 2013).
4 An earlier version of the paper reported regression results including NGPF‐G Ownership Postcrisis, that is, the interaction
between NGPF‐G Ownership and an indicator variable that equals one for the years 2009–2013, and zero otherwise. This
variable picks up any differential effect of NGPF‐G investment on employment following the 2008 financial crisis. NGPF‐G
Ownership Precrisis is the equivalent for the precrisis period. NGPF‐G Ownership Postcrisis was found to be positive and sig-
nificant, whereas NGPF‐G Ownership Precrisis was not found to be significant.
GOERGEN ET AL. 2995 We focus on the year 2009 for the following reason. The annual unemployment rate in the United Kingdom increased from
5.7% in 2008 to 7.6% in 2009. It then remained at around that level until 2013 inclusive. See https://www.ons.gov.uk/
employmentandlabourmarket/peoplenotinwork/unemployment/timeseries/mgsx/lms.
6 For regressions (2) and (8), the coefficient from the system GMM regression is slightly higher than the coefficient from the
OLS regression.
7 Being time‐invariant, both variables are differenced away in the WG regressions.
8 See Table A3 for details of the ultimate largest shareholders in our sample firms. There are 363 NGPF‐G target firms in
2012, but data on the ultimate largest shareholder are available for only 262 of these firms.
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302 GOERGEN ET AL.APPENDIXTABLE A1 Definitions of the variables
Variable Definition
Market capitalisation The closing share price times the number of issued shares at that date
Sales Total revenue
Sales growth Annual growth in revenue (%)
Market‐to‐book ratio The market value of equity divided by the book value of equity
Return on assets Net income before taxation divided by total assets (%)
Cash over total assets The proportion of total assets in the form of cash or cash equivalents (%)
ST debt over total assets Short‐term liabilities divided by total assets (%)
Dividend yield The total dividend per share divided by the closing share price (%)
Ln (employees t−1) The natural logarithm of the number of employees in t−1
Ln (remuneration over employees t) The natural logarithm of real wages in t over the number of employees in t
Ln (turnover over employees t) The natural logarithm of real turnover in t over the number of employees in t
Target firm Indicator variable set to one if there is NGPF‐G investment during at least
one year of the period of study, and zero otherwise. This indicator variable
measures the employment effects affecting target firms independent of the
NGPF‐G investment
NGPF‐G ownership t Percentage of ownership held by NGPF‐G in t
NGPF‐G ownership * Year 2009
(No NGPF‐G ownership
* Year 2009)
This measures the effect of NGPF‐G ownership (the absence of NGPF‐G
ownership) in 2009. It is the interaction between NGPF‐G ownership
(no NGPF‐G ownership, i.e., an indicator variable set to one if there
is no NGPF‐G ownership, and set to zero otherwise) and the year 2009
indicator variable
NGPF‐G year t Indicator variable set to one for firm‐year observations during which
there is NGPF‐G investment. It is also set to one for the same years
for the equivalent control firm. It is set to zero otherwise. This variable
would pick up industry wide employment effects (as well as any other
effects pertaining to other firm characteristics) that affect all firms in
that industry (and/or with the same firm characteristics) at a particular
time (the years with NGPF‐G investment) and that are not due to the
NGPF‐G investment
Ownership
largest shareholder
The proportion of shares held by the ultimate largest shareholder
UO X Indicator variable set to one if the ultimate largest shareholder is of type X
where X is the state, a family, a pension fund, a venture capitalist/private
equity house, an industrial company, another type of shareholder, or own
treasury shares
TABLE A2 Prematching and postmatching logits
(1) (2)
Prematching logit Postmatching logit
Ln (market capitalisation t−1) 0.753***
(.000)
−0.029
(.921)
Ln (sales t−1) 0.279***
(.000)
0.079
(.580)
Ln (total assets t−1) 0.088
(.363)
0.019
(.946)
Ln (sales growth t−1) 0.878***
(.000)
0.266*
(.081)
Ln (market‐to‐book ratio t−1) −29.044
(.815)
−0.160
(.643)
Ln (return on assets t−1) −0.141
(.110)
−62.481
(.728)
Ln (cash over total assets t−1) −0.199**
(.045)
0.185
(.190)
Ln (ST debt over total assets t−1) 0.292*
(.090)
0.143
(.344)
Ln (dividend yield t−1) 252.718
(.825)
0.207
(.417)
Constant 0.753***
(.000)
573.230
(.729)
Observations 3501 222
Pseudo‐R2 .332 .021
χ2 465.659 6.452
p .000 .694
TABLE A3 Distribution of types of ultimate largest shareholder in the Norwegian Government Pension Fund‐Global
(NGPF‐G) target firms in 2012
Type of ultimate largest shareholder Percentage of NGPF‐G target firms
State 1.53%
Family 9.54%
Pension fund 15.27%
Venture capitalist/private equity house 1.15%
Industrial firm 11.45%
Other 0.38%
Own treasury shares 0.38%
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